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HANNO KUBE"

Private Property in Natural Resources
and The Public Weal in German
Law-Latent Similarities to the Public
Trust Doctrine?
ABSTRACT
The German legal system has established theframework of
the "Offentliche Sache" in order to conceptually describe the
interplay between private ownership rights in naturalresourcesand
restrictionson their exclusive use for the benefit of the public. The
constitutionality of resource-protecting "Offintliche Sache"restrictions is determined by the very abstract notions of the
"Sozialpflichtigkeit" and the "Situationsgebundenheit"of property.
A closer analysis of relevantcases demonstrates that these notions
only become operable when substantive value-judgments are
introduced into the balancing process. The content of these valuejudgments depends on the importanceassigned to specific public
interests at any given moment of time. After the promulgation of
the FederalWater Code in 1957 and particularlyafter the adoption
of amendments in 1976 and 1985, the concrete arguments put
forward to illustrate the content of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and
"Situationsgebundenheit" in the context of water law reveal the
underlying substantive value-judgments inherent in the abstract
terms. The effect of these value-judgments is that little attention is
actually being paid to the extent to which private property rights
are being restricted,considerationsfocus on the public interest in
the specific resources.A current trend in Germannatural resources
law openly recognizes the importance of these underlying valuejudgments by positively assigningnatural resources to the public
and thereby negatively defining the possible scope of private
property. This evolving concept in German law has striking
similarity to the American public trust doctrine. Further
investigationof the stritcturalparallelsbetween the concepts might
not only improve the understandingof German law, but also reveal
new insight into the nature of the public trustdoctrine.

* Hanno Kube, LLM. (Comell) is a research and teaching assistant for constitutional law
at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. Address: Hanno Kube, LL.M., Institut fOr Finanzund Steuerrecht (Lehrstuhl Prof. Dr. Paul Kirchhof), Juristisches Seminar der Universitit
Heidelberg, Friedrich-Ebert-Anlage 6-10, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany.
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A. THE DEMARCATION OF LEGITIMATE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
INTERESTS: IN SEARCH OF THE BALANCE
In Germany and America unanswered questions persist about the
proper balance between public and private interests in natural resources.
Private property holders invoke their vested rights in the goods at stake;
society at large asserts its dependence on the resources involved for its
survival and well being.
Embedded in their own historical, cultural and political
circumstances the German and the American legal systems developed very
different concepts to address the problem of demarcating legitimate
interests of private resource owners and the public. While the American law
focuses on preserving private property rights through the takings clause,
the German law has established a systematic framework for regulating and
restricting these rights. The following overview is intended to introduce this
system to the American reader and to outline current trends in German law
that begin to openly take account of value judgments actually underlying
the established abstract framework. These trends show strong parallels to
the American public trust doctrine.
B. PRIVATE PROPERTY IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
PUBLIC WEAL IN GERMAN LAW
I.

EARLY APPROACHES

1. The concept of "Regalien"
German property law during the Middle Ages comprised very few
concepts of the old Roman law.1 The legal regime governing property in
natural resources was rooted in the Germanic law concept of "Regalien."
According to this concept, the nobility owned many natural goods, which
could, however, be used by the citizens.2 The concept of "Regalien"
reconciled the ownership interests of the sovereigns with the concrete
usufructuary interests of the citizens.

1. Otto Kimminich, Eigentum, in STAATSLBxiKON DER GoERRESGCESLLSCHAF 162 (7th
ed. 1986).
2. Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, Vom 6ffentlichen Eigentum zur 6ffentlichen Sache, 1987 NEUE
ZETrscawr FOR VERWALTUNGSECHT 1025,1026.
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2. Impact of the Roman law
After the revival and the adoption oJ Roman law in Germany the
sophisticated, abstract Roman ideas of "dominium" and "proprietas" were
introduced, but the old Germanic property concepts in many cases
remained codified in statutes? However, the lawyers, now educated in the
Roman law, gave those Germanic statutes new interpretations. Thus, a new
property regime emerged, combining Germanic and Roman law concepts.
Particularly in the larger cities, property now became an extensive
individual right. The Roman law idea of "dominium" extended beyond the
sovereign, to the free citizens." With the rise of the "Rechtsstaat" (rule of
law) in the middle of the 19th century, the status of individual owners was
once more strengthened. Legal restrictions were gradually imposed on
administrative curtailments of property rights, finally resulting in the
concept of compensation for takings5
However, different more specific regulatory structures evolved for
many natural resources, because vesting individual "dominium" rights in
them was particularly critical. The Prussian General Code of 1794, for
example, states that "the roads, the navigable streams, the shores of the sea
and the harbors are common property of the state."6 Therefore, despite the
general rise of individual exclusive property rights, the concept of
"Regalien" as applied to natural resources was widely sustained.
Finally, towards the end of the 19th century, also natural resources
increasingly became subject to private, individual ownershp. 7 Because of
the importance of these resources to the community, however, restrictions
on the extent of such private property rights were soon introduced. On the
constitutional level, this is reflected in Art.153 of the Weimar Constitution
(1919), that underscores that individual "property obliges. Its use shall
equally serve the public weal." This formulation can be found today in
Art.14 II Basic Law (Grundgesetz), at the heart of the constitutional
codification of property law. Hence, whether within the concept of
"Regalien" or as restrictions on private ownership, the public interest in
natural goods was recognized.

3. Kimminich, supra note 1,at 162.
4, This is reflected in codifications such as § 362 ABGB (1811) or in I ch. 2 § 1 BAVARIAN
CODEX MAxiNULANEUs BAVAICUS CIvius (1756).
5. See § 164 FRANKFURT CoNsrmTON (1849) or §§ 74, 75 INTRODuCTnON TO THE
PRUSSIAN GENERAL CODE (1794).
6. See § 211114 PRUSSIAN GENERAL CODE (1794).
7. This will be exemplified below in the area of water law; see discussion infra Part
B.IV.1.
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3. The emergence of fiscal ownership of natural resources
Although "Regalien" became an anomaly with the rise of the
constitutional state and the idea of "Rechtg-staat," in some cases the concept
survived the privatization of many natural goods in the end of the 19th
century. Around the year 1900, Courts' as well as legal scholars' increasingly used the forms of the private law to explain the relationship of the state
to "Regalien." This was one of the first applications of the concept of "fiscal
property" which describes the idea that the state is owner of private
property just like any other individual owner. Although the state property
in "Regalien" was at that time formally called "public property," "public"
only signified that the "fiscal" power, i.e. the power of the state to dispose
of the property in the forms of the private law, was restricted to the benefit
of the public weal.10 Likewise, the private law was more and more often
employed to describe the usufructuary interests that were vested in the
citizens.
4. Public ownership
The idea of a "truly public" state ownership of natural goods,
distinct from the forms of the private law, was subsequently developed.
Otto Mayer, one of the major protagonists of this development, mainly
drew from French sources." He postulated that goods with vital importance
to the public could only be subject to a form of public property, which "does
not have anything to do with private property." Once a good is dedicated
to the public, it becomes subject to full public ownership. Any kind of
private property, whether by the state as fiscal property or by individuals,
becomes impossible. According to Mayer, the public/private separation
applies to goods that had remained "Regalien" as well as to goods vested
in individuals.
However, Mayer's theory of a "truly public" ownership of all goods
with specific importance to the public did not prevail. The concept of
private, i.e. fiscal, state property that is restricted to the benefit of the public
weal was so successful that a new approach was not considered necessary.
Probably, Mayer's theory was founded on a conception of government that
was too authoritative for the political atmosphere of the period. 3

8. See the decisions of the Reichsgericht RGZ 3, 236 (238) or RGZ 40, 280 (285).
9. See Schrnidt-Jortzig, supra note 2, at 1026.
10. Id.
11. OTTO MAYER, DEuTscHEs VERWALTUNGSRUCHT VOL. 1146 (3rd ed. 1924).
12. Schmidt-Jortzig, supra note 2, at 1026.
13. Id.
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In certain specific areas, however, the concept of a "truly public"
ownership became law. Some statutory provisions of the Lander today provide for a distinct public state ownership in, for example, waterbeds in
Baden-Wttrttemberg 4 and dikes in Hamburg.15 This public state ownership
is expressly distinguished from private, fiscal state ownership. The resources are not subject to the regime of the private law 6 and disputes are settled
in administrative law courts, not private law courts. 7 The Federal Constitutional Court has confirmed this form of state ownership under certain
conditions." However, today most natural goods are not subject to public
state ownership as provided for by the cited Lander statutes.
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE "OFFENTLICHE SACHE"
1.

Concept

As the idea of restricting private property in natural resources for
the public benefit developed, a new concept evolved: The "Offentliche
Sache." Fully disregarding ownership, the "Offentliche Sache" regulates
only the use of the resource. This currently prevailing approach for the legal
management of natural goods is conceivable for all goods which "have an
existential value for a great number of the members of the community and
which are therefore to be regulated regarding their use."' 9 The concept,
therefore, covers goods in individual ownership, in state ownership, and
also goods that have no owner at all.
The key to understanding the idea of the "Offentliche Sache" is the
concept of "Widmung" ("dedication to the public"). The dedication is an
administrative act which is a necessary requirement subjecting a resource
to restrictions in the interest of the public weal. Traditionally, dedications
originating in the "natural disposition" of a good are generally not accepted
in German law." However, dedications resulting from custom, as for
example in the case of beaches and tidelands, are recognized.

14. See § 4 Water Code of Baden-Wtirttemberg (1988).
15. See § 2 1, II Dike Regulation Law of Hamburg (1964).
16. See § 5 Water Code of Baden-Wtirttemberg (1988).
17. In Germany, administrative law courts are a distinct part of the judicial branch
deciding upon questions of the public law.
18. See, for example, the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 24, 367
(382) (confirming the constitutionality of the form of a "truly public" ownership for
resources, which had previously been privately owned).
19. Schmidt-Jortzig, supra note 2, at 1027.
20. Id. at 1028.
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The consequence of a dedication is that the private owner (if there
is one) loses the power to use or even to dispose of the property to the
extent to which the resource has been dedicated. The concept of the
"Offentliche Sache" supplants the private powers with state management
to the extent necessary.2' The restriction following the dedication, the
"Offentlichrechtliche Dienstbarkeit,"2' directly attaches to the resource itself
and is independent of the property holder. It is therefore comparable to
servitude in American property law. Hence, the dedication runs with the
property, and restricts subsequent buyers, for reasons of public interest.
What had above (B.I.4.) been described as the transfer to a "truly
public ownership," as provided for in certain Under statutes, can be
understood as the most extreme example of a "Offentliche Sache"application. Here the dedication supplants all private powers. The state
becomes manager and "public" owner of the resource.
2. Applications on the statutory level
Examples of "Offentliche Sachen" are to be found in numerous
statutes of the public environmental law. Such statutes generally authorize
agencies to issue administrative regulations, which dedicate a part or the
whole of a resource's uses to the public or which restrict private owners in
other ways to the benefit of the public. The following statutes illustrate the
principle:
Environmental protection laws in combination with dedications to
the public prohibit, for example, recreational land uses, fishing, hunting, or
road construction in areas expressly deemed to be of particular
environmental significance.7
Air pollution legislation restricts the scope of possible uses of plants
that produce polluting substances by generally requiring permits.24
Water laws prohibit the use of surface water and groundwater by
landowners, unless explicitly and individually allowed to do so by the
administration.75

21. Fritz Freudling, Eigentum an Gewdssern, 1976 BAYER!SCHESVERWALTUNGS8LATr 141
(referring to a decision of the Bavarian Administrative Law Court (BayVGH of 12.6.1974).
22. HANsJ. WoLF ET AL., VERWALTUNGSREcHT I, §42 n.6 (10th ed. 1994).
23. Compare the regulations in the Bundesnaturschutzgesetz and in the
Uandesnaturschutzgesetze.
24. Compare the regulations in the Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz.
25. Compare the regulations in the Wasserhaushaltsgesetz and in the
Landeswassergesetze.
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3. Regulatory power the duty to regulate?
The authority of administrative agencies to issue dedications of
privatized resources to the benefit of the public is based on federal and state
statutes. But this is only the case if the statutes themselves are
constitutional. For the statutes to be constitutional the promulgating
legislature needs to have the authority to vest the power to dedicate in
executive agencies. 26
The authority of the federal parliament to issue legislation in the
area of natural resources is generally founded, unless explicitly stated in the
Constitution, ' on the argument that the scarcity of publicly valued natural
goods implies a parliamentary right to assume responsibility to distribute
and manage the resources.' To the extent that publicly valued natural
goods are considered to be scarce, the parliamentary statutes conferring
power to the executive agencies to dedicate these resources to the public are
thus insofar constitutional. 29
Does parliament's responsibility include a duty to sustain and
distribute publicly valued scarce natural goods? A decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court in the context of land use planning appears to indicate
an affirmative answer: "The impossibility to increase the area of land as
well as its absolute importance to everybody prohibit leaving its use
completely to the management through market forces."" Likewise, many
legal scholars base an affirmative parliamentary obligation on the limited
availability of natural goods as well as on everybody's dependence on
them.s1
A new and very strong argument for the assumption of a
parliamentary duty to sustain and distribute natural goods is based on the
recently promulgated Art.20a Basic Law. This provision makes state action
to protect the environment an important objective. 32 Further clarification as

26. This is due to the German concept of the "Gesetzesvorbehalt": A state entity is only
legitimized to act, if it has explicitly been authorized to do so by law.
27. E.g., Art.74 Nr.24; Art.75 Nr.3, 4 Basic Law.
28. Wilfried Berg, Verwaltung des Mangels, 1976 DER STAAT, 1, 11, with further
references.
29. Id. at 12 n.45.
30. See the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 21,73 (82).
31. See Berg, supra note 28, at 12f.; see also ERNST FORSTHOFF, LEHRuUCH DES
VERWALTUNGSRECHTs 397 (10th ed. 1973) (applying the idea to the limited capacity of roads
and resulting state duties concerning their management).
32. For a general discussion, see Karl E. Heinz, Staatsziel Umweltschutz in
rechtstheoretischerund verfassungstheoretischerSicht, 1994 NATUR UND REcHT 1ff.; Arnd Uhle,
Das Staatsziel Umweltschutz im System der grundgesetzlichen Ordnung,1993 DIE OFFENTIACHE
VERWALTUNG 947; Klaus Meyer-Teschendorf, Verfassungsmassiger Schutz der natarlichen
Lebensgrundlagen,1994 ZEnScHRWr FOR RECHTSPVLrriK 73; Hans-Gunter Henneke, DerSchutz
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to the scope of duties implied in Art.20a Basic Law will be necessary.
However, the general assumption of an affirmative parliamentary
obligation to protect natural resources is strongly reinforced by this new
provision.
III. DEFINITION OR CURTAILMENT: THE TAKINGS PROBLEM
The dedication of a resource to the public, whether total or only
partial,3 poses questions about possible conflicts with Art.14 11 Basic Law,
the constitutional protection of private property.-" These questions are at the
heart of judicial and scientific discussion in Germany. Similar questions
arise in the United States in the debate over public regulation and loss of
private property rights.
In Germany the contents and limits of property ate defined by
statutes (Art.14 12 Basic Law). For many years an owner was compensated
for a taking whenever a redefinition or other infringement burdened him
in a disproportionate way or with particular intensity (Art.14 III Basic
Law).3 In 1981, however, the Federal Constitutional Court drew a clear line
between Art.14 I and III Basic Law and stated that a taking has certain
formal prerequisites. 7 If those prerequisites are not met, Art.14 III Basic
Law cannot come into play. Therefore, an unduly burdensome redefinition
of property does not automatically become a taking. However, even though
not a taking, an unduly burdensome redefinition of property is, of course,

der natarlichen Lebensgrundlagen in Art.20a GG, 1995 NATUR UND RECHT 325ff.; Dietrich
Murswiek, Staatsziel Umweltschutz (Art.20a GG), 1996 NEur ZErrscHluFr FOR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 222ff.

33. As was shown above, dedications in the framework of the concept of the Offentliche
Sache can affect private property rights to different degrees, up to the point, where the
private rights are completely supplanted by state management.
34. Art.14 Basic Law:
(I) Property and inheritance are guaranteed. Contents and limits are
determined by law.
(I) Property obliges. Its use shall equally serve the public weal.
(Ill) A taking is only permissible for reasons of the public weal. It has to be
based on a law that regulates the kind and extent of the compensation. The
compensation has to be determined based on a just balancing of the
interests of the public and the concerned persons. Regarding the extent of
the compensation in case of conflict the civil law courts offer legal redress.
35. Id.
36. Id.

37. This isthe so-called Nassauskiesungsurteil; BVerfGE 58,300. The Court underscored
that Art.14 III Basic Law requires a law, a parliamentary decision, as the basis for any taking.

Any unduly burdensome infringement of a property right that isnot based on a takings law
cannot be accepted by the owner in exchange for a compensation. Such an infringement
remains unconstitutional and has to be attacked in an administrative law court.
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unconstitutional in the framework of Art.14 I Basic Law and cannot serve
as a basis for constitutional state action.
When analyzing the constitutionality of regulatory state action the
first step is therefore to determine whether the specific redefinition of
property, in our context the dedication of a privatized natural resource to
the public, is unduly burdensome. The major German courts, the Federal
Constitutional Court, the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal
Supreme Court have developed different criteria for distinguishing
constitutional from unconstitutional dedications within the framework of
Art.14 I Basic Law.3
1. "Sozialpflichtigkeit"
The Federal Constitutional Court finds a proper balance between
public and private interests in natural resources and an adequate definition
of the "limits" of property (Art.14 12 Basic Law) by focusing on the concept
of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" ("social obligation"). "Sozialpflichtigkeit" is a
general recognition that property, even though private, must be seen in a
social context, with the potential to benefit the public. This concept is
expressly formulated in Art.14 II Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional
Court thus draws directly upon Art.14 II Basic Law in order to decide upon
the constitutionality of property-restricting regulations.39
As a base norm, the private use and disposition of property is
constitutionally guaranteed.4 Those property interests, which are of
elementary importance for the use and enjoyment of the property and
which are an inherent constitutional liberty, cannot be taken away at all
according to Art.14 I Basic Law. 4' However, peripheral aspects of the
property right may be considered public according to Art.14 II Basic Law.
The concept of "Sozialpflichtigkeit," which defines the scope of
possible restrictions of the ownership right around the central "core," has
different consequences for different kinds of property. 42 If the object is of

38. As there is no comprehensive hierarchical relationship between the Federal Supreme
Court, the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional Court, the approaches of all three Courts are relevant. Even though the Federal Constitutional Court generally
has the authority to interpret the Constitution with binding effect for all other courts,
questions concerning the extent of the compensation in the context of Art.14 IllIBasic Law
are dealt with by the civil law courts. See Art.14 III Basic Law.
39. See Hans W. Rengeling, Das Grundeigentum als Schutzobjekt der Eigentumsgarantie
(Art.14 GG) und als Gegenstand verwaltungsrechtlicher Planung, Gestaltung und
Schrankensetzung,105 ARCHLY DES OFFENTUCHEN RECMS 423, 435.
40. See BVerfGE 24, 367 (389).
41. See BVerfGE 24, 367 (389); 42, 263 (295); 50, 290 (341).
42. See BVerfGE 21,73 (83); 50,290 (341).
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particular importance to the public, i.e. if the public is relying on the
possibility of its continued use, the power of the redefining legislator is
more extensive.' Furthermore, the legislature may redefine the contents of
property in natural resources "to adapt to changing social and economic
circumstances."" Provisions allocating use and enjoyment rights in natural
resources to the public are thus consistent with Art.14 11 Basic Law as long
as serve45 the public weal on the basis of Art. 14 II Basic Law ("Gemeinwohl"). ,
The concept of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" has been used relatively
consistently. The reason for this consistency may be that "Sozialpflichtigkeit" is an extraordinarily wide and comprehensive criterion, which can
easily adapt to changing judicial motivations.
2. "Situationsgebundenheit"
The Federal Supreme Court formally uses the "Sonderopfertheorie" ("theory of unequal sacrifice") to determine the constitutionality
of property restrictions according to Art.14 I 2 Basic Law. As its name
implies, the theory centers on equality. In practice, however, the Court
increasingly considers factors such as the intensity and the bearing of the
regulation as well as its proportionality. These latter criteria, focusing on the
gravity of the encroachments, are also central to many decisions of the
Federal Administrative Court that formally bases its rulings on the
"Schweretheorie" ("theory of particular gravity"). In order to make these
factors more operable both courts employ the so-called concept of
"Situationsgebundenheit" ("situational commitment"). "Situationsgebundenheit" describes the idea that private property is interwoven with its
physical and social surroundings and that a particular environmental
context determines the scope of admissible restrictions.
Early decisions of the Federal Supreme Court held restrictions of
private property in a natural resource which prohibit the use of a resource
that is irreconcilable with the resource's "Situationsgebundenheit" to be
constitutional if the contested use is only prospective and not yet
exercised.47 If a usufructuary right has already been exercised, it could not

43. See Rengeling, supra note 39, at 437.
44. See BVerfGE 24, 367 (389).
45. See Rengeling, supra note 39, at 431. This relates to the introduction of "truly public"
property as in the example of the water law of several Under. See supra 1.1.4.
46. For a general introduction to the idea of the public weal (Gemeinwohl) in Germany
see Walter Kerber, Gemeinwohl, in STAATsLEXIKON DER GOERRESGEsELLSCHAPT 857ff. (7th ed.

1986).
47. See the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof in BGHZ 23,30 (Gronflachenurteil): 1956;
BGH DVBI. 1957,861 (Buchendomurteil): 1957; BGH MDR 1959,558 (Gipsabbauurteil): 1959.
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be prohibited without violating Art.14 11 Basic Law with the exception of
a possible formal taking according to Art.14 III Basic Law that has to be
compensated). The constitutional scope of property restrictions was
judicially extended, however, when the Federal Supreme Court
subsequently also held executive dedications to the public, which restrict
already exercised usufructuary rights of the owner, to be reconcilable with
the constitutional protection of property. The criterion of "prior use" had
diminished in importance. The modified concept of "Situationsgebundenheit" tested whether a "reasonable owner, from an economic point of
view, would use a resource in a particular way." 4
The ambiguity and fuzziness of "Situationsgebundenheit" became
even more apparent, when the Federal Supreme Court subsequently used
the concept against the protection of natural resources. In the context of
water law, the Court stated that it would be irreconcilable with Art.14 1 1
Basic Law according to "Situationsgebundenheit", if a "naturally given"
even if unexercised "possibility of use and economic exploitation of a
resource is prohibited, from a reasonable and economic point of view."49
However, the Federal Supreme Court partially revoked this extreme view"
after the Federal Constitutional Court had overruled earlier Federal
Supreme Court decisions in the "Nassauskiesung"-case of 1981.1 The
concept of scrutinizing constitutional redefinitions of property rights
according to the property's "Situationsgebundenheit" has therefore
experienced considerably varying interpretations and has become an often
cited, but rather arbitrary 2 criterion.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS IN WATER
The way in which the courts adjudicate water law uncovers the
actual considerations and value judgments underlying the abstract judicial
notions of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and "Situationsgebundenheit."
Water law presents a good example of a legal regime, which takes
societal interests and the public weal into account. The trend in German

48. See the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof in BGHZ 54, 293 (Altes Wasserrechtsurteil): 1970; BGHZ 48,193 (KOlner Hinterhausurteil): 1967.
49. See the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in BGHZ 60, 127, (133) (Erstes
Nassauskiesungsurteil); see also BGHZ 60,145.
50.

See BGHZ 84, 223 (226); 90,4, (g); See MICHAEL KLOEPFER, UMWELTRECHT, 52 n.78

(1989).
51. BVerfGE 58, 300 (Nassauskiesungsurteil); the discussion of the case follows in the
case study infra Part B.IV.3.c.
52. HANsJ. PAPIER, KO mMENTIRUNG ZU ART.14 GG n.397 (THEODOR MAUNZ E' al. eds.,

1994).
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water law is toward the "de-individualization of a legal framework".' the
promulgation of the Federal Water Code (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz; WHG) in
1957 may have been the first step in the "transfer of water into collective
ownership."' Because of its long history, water law in Germany can serve
as a model for other areas of natural resources law.
1. Early legislation
Before the Federal Water Code was promulgated in 1957, 19
different water law regimes were in force in Germany. Each varied
substantially as to the attribution of ownership in waterbeds and of the
rights to make use of the water.' These variations were due to the
aforementioned emergence of private ownership in natural resources (B.I.2.)
in the second half of the 19th century; private ownership in water and
waterbeds was introduced in some, but not in all of the states.
For example, legal approaches to surface water varied. Some
regimes used the private law and considered the right to use water as a
right annexed to the private ownership right in the waterbed (comp. § 903
Civil Code). Even if the state intervened to allow for the use by someone
other than the owner of the watershed, this intervention had to be classified
in private law categories.56 Some regimes, on the other hand, considered
surface water to be a public good and did not provide for the possibility of
any private usufructuary rights in this resource. According to this
conception, usufructuary rights were granted by the executive as rights of
the public law below the constitutional level (subjektive offentliche
Rechte).5 7 Whether riparian owners, the owners of the waterbeds, or other
particularly situated parties had a claim to such public law rights depended
on the respective statutes.
Groundwater approaches were similarly non-uniform. Some
Lander codifications around the turn of this century recognized a right of
land owners to make use of the groundwater beneath their lands as being
part of their private land right (comp. § 903 Civil Code).58 Again, restrictions
were considered to be of a private law character." Other regimes provided

53.
54.

See KLOEPFER, supranote 50, at 603.
Paul Klemmer, Wasser, in STAATSLEXIKON DER GOERRESGESELLSCHAFr 884, 890 (7th

ed. 1986).
55. Ed Dellian, Gewbssereigentum und Gewilsserbenutzung, 1g67 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOcHENzErrScHRIFr 520, 521.

56. As an extreme example see §§ 40,46,81 PRUSSIAN WATER CODE (1913).
57.

See in particular the WATER CODE OF BADEN-WORT!EMBERG (1900).

58. Dellian, supra note 55, at 522.
59. A good example of a private law restriction again provide §S 196, 200 PRuSSIAN
WATER CODE (1913).
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for a comprehensive management and distribution of groundwater through
public law mechanisms.' Here, the discussion of whether landowners had
a general entitlement to be granted a public law permit to use groundwater
was particularly controversial. 1
For both surface and groundwater, all regimes thus provided for
certain restrictions of individual property rights to the benefit of the public,
whether those restrictions originated in the public law or the private law.
The difference lay in whether or not the owners of water beds or riparian
owners had a general usufructuary right (following their private law
ownership rights) or a claim to be granted a permit to use water (in the
framework of the public law). Whatever the system, the Lander statutes
were often disputed. With the promulgation of the Federal Water Code in
1957 this disparity came to an end.
2. The Federal Water Code (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz)
a) Parliamentary decision for water as a "Offentliche Sache"
In the beginning of the 1950s the German Federal parliament
realized that the contemporary water law regime had become obscure and
unsatisfactory. Also, the Lander legislatures saw the general need for more
comprehensive planning and for foresight and precaution in regulation of
the elementary bases of life.
Consequently the Federal parliament made use of its constitutional
authority to enact a skeleton law in the area of water resources according
to Art.75 Nr.4 Basic Law. The result was the Federal Water Code
promulgated in 1957. The objective of the code was and still is, as stated in
the parliamentary debates, "the attainment of a sensible and useful
distribution of the surface water and of the groundwater regarding quantity
and quality in the whole of the Federal Republic."62 This aim can only be
reached, it was perceived, "if the free disposition by private owners is
restricted and if the consideration of the public weal is the starting point of
all action."' The Federal parliament was aware of the diverse regulations
in the Lander and proceeded pragmatically by stating that "it is
unnecessary and constitutionally problematic to abolish these differences
completely in a skeleton law." Legislators used the concept of the

60. See, Art.19 BAVARIAN WATER CODE(1907).
61. Horst Sendler, Wassernutzung und Eigentum, (1975-76) ZEIrSCHRIFr FOR
WASSERRECHT, at 7.

62. See the parliamentary statement in Schriftlicher Bericht des 2.Sonderausschusses Wasserhaushaltsgesetz -, Bundestags-Drucksache 2/3536 (1953) at 4.
63. Id.
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"Offentliche Sache" as a basis for the general scheme. As the lawmakers
explained, the concept allows for "significant administrative influence on
the use of water."" While the L~tnder statutes had provided for either
private usufructuary rights in water resources or for public law entitlements
to the use of water, the new Federal Water Code abolished this distinction,
introducing an overarching, resource-distributing and -managing public
law regime according to the concept of the "Offentliche Sache."
Within this framework a prospective water user must obtain a
permit to use water.' A land property owner has no claim to receive such
a permit. Section 6 WHG expressly provides that in cases, in which a permit
would negatively affect the public weal, especially in regard to sufficient
amounts of water for the public, this permit must not be granted. No
provision positively obliges the administration to issue a permit. Lobbied
by industry interest groups" several members of parliament attempted to
change the formulation of § 6 WHG from "must be denied if" into "can only
be denied if." 67 The majority of the house, however, recognized that the
individual entitlement arising as a consequence of such a change in words
would completely undermine "the bitterly needed protection of the water
resources.""
Therefore, in the final version of the Code, § 6 WHG was founded
on the belief that "regarding the importance of the supply with water for
the general public, any negative effect on this supply will normally have to
lead to the denial of a permit."' An entitlement to be granted a permit
"appears to be irreconcilable with the already now extraordinarily critical
situation of the water supply. This situation can only be dealt with, if the
currently available resources are being used with the greatest-possible
future-oriented and planning efficiency.""

64.
65.

Id.
Such uses are listed in § 3 WHG and comprise not only diverting the water itself, but

also the discharge of materials into the water. Exceptions to the requirement of a permit can
be found in, for example, §§ 23ff. WHG, allowing for the free use of water, if the amounts
used are very insignificant.
66. See supra note 62.
67. See Anderungsantrag zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Ordnung des
Wasserhaushalts, Stenogr. Ber. Bd.37, 216. Sitzung, p.12848.
68. See supranote 62.
69. Id. at 10.

70,

Id.
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b) Constitutionality of the new regime in general
aa) Scholarly opinions
To some authors, the new federal water law regime seemed
irreconcilable with Art.14 1 1 Basic Law, the constitutional protection of
property. Dellian asserts that if private property in a waterbed was
previously recognized as the substantive basis for the right to use water this
right must be valid despite the new regulation?' According to Dellian, the
proper constitutional interpretation of the permit requirement is that the
permit is of merely declaratory character. The property owner has a claim
to receive a permit, unless very important reasons concerning the public
weal legitimize a denial. Similarly, Papier holds that the one-sided
consideration of the public weal in the new statute completely ignores
legitimate interests of the land owners.' He agrees that it is the legislator's
task to define property rights according to Art.14 1 2 Basic Law, but he
equally asserts that a water permit system, which does not as a general rule
provide for entitlements for the land owners, transgresses the boundaries
of "Sozialpflichtigkeit." Employing the concept of proportionality he comes
to the same conclusion as Dellian: The Federal Water Code must be
interpreted as generally providing for entitlements of the land owners to be
granted a permit to use water.
The great majority of authors, however, approves of the new
system and considers it to be in consistence with Art.14 I 1 Basic Law.
Rights to use water generally do not arise from land property or from other
private law powers after the redefinition according to the Federal Water
Code, holds Breuer.' The rights arise from the distributive decisions of the
executive branch on the basis of the public law regime: "Because of their
vital importance to the well-being of the community and because of their
current scarcity water resources need state planning and care."74 The
various and sensitive relationships between different water bodies, it is
argued, require a comprehensive and understanding management. For
these reasons the property restrictions following the Federal Water Code are
from the perspective of "Sozialpflichtigkeit,"
constitutional
"Situationsgebundenheit" and the concept of proportionality. According to

71. Dellian, supra note 55, at 523, 524. Dellian actually argues along the lines that he
could not find the necessary dedication of water to the public in the new statute.
72. PAPIER, supra note 52, at n.435; RUDOLF WENDr, EIGENTUM UND GESETzGEBUNG 249
(1985); HERBERT KROGER, GRUNDFRAGEN EINER REcH1srAATCHEN WASsERGESETZGEGBUNG
27 (1957) (who likewise sees a collision with the concept of proportionality).
73. Rudiger Breuer, Die Verfassungsm*ssigkeit der wasserwirtschaftsrechtlichen
Benutzungsordnung,1979-80 ZMTSCM FOR WAS ERRECHT, at 78, 79, with further citations.
74. Id. at 97.
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the majority opinion, they are therefore consistent with Art.14 1 1 Basic
Law.7"
bb) The judiciary
The major courts similarly hold the new regime generally to be
constitutional. Soon after the adoption of the Federal Water Code the
Federal Constitutional Court decided that a "well-ordered water
distribution system is necessary for the general public as well as for the
economy."7' The Federal Supreme Court, even though it held an ambiguous
position in the special-case of groundwater (see below B.IV.3.a), stated that
the new regulation is justified, "because the natural supply of water,
quantitatively and qualitatively, is of paramount importance for the
economic development of the country as well as for the sustenance of life
in general."' Finally, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the
reason, why the strict regime does not violate Art.14 11 Basic Law is that
"the water resources are particularly vulnerable regarding pollution."s
cc) Evaluation
The excerpts presented above from scholarly comments on the
constitutionality of the Federal Water Code of 1957 as well as the quotations
from court decisions on the subject demonstrate the actual motives and
considerations that underlie concepts like "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and
"Situationsgebundenheit,," when they are used to demarcate public and
private interests in an individual case. When applied to a specific situation
and a particular natural resource conflict, the abstract notions become more
concrete and operable. Recurring formulations like the following emphasize
that the concepts mainly focus on the perceived public need:
"... Of vital importance to the well-being of the community.
of paramount importance for the economic
.
..
development . . .as well as for the sustenance of life in
general...", "... regarding the importance of the supply with
water for the general public... ... affect the public weal
.." etc.7
By using terms like "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and "Situationsgebundenheit"
judges and scholars actually introduce substantive values into the process

75. See also FRANK SIEDER ETAL,WA.ERuAUSHALTGESETz, KoMMENTAR, Munchen, 1994,
§ la, n.24; PAuL GIESEKE ET AL., WASsERHAUsHALTSGESETz, KOMMENTAR, MIlnchen, 1992, §
la, n.29.
76. BVerfGE 10,107 (113) (1959).
77. BGHZ 49, 72 (1967).
78. BVerwGE 55,231 (1978).
79. Id. and accompanying text.
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of delineating public and private claims in natural resources. These
substantive values that are concealed by the abstract wording of the
concepts converge, in the case of water, into one common perception: Water
as a natural resource is so important to the well-being of the whole
community that the uncompensated denial of its use by individual owners
must be possible. "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and "Situationsgebundenheit" are
therefore in practicelessconcerned with the "social obligation" or the "situational
commitment" of a specific piece of property, and much more with the natureof the
protected resource itself. Its attributedvalue to society overshadows even grave
encroachmentsan individualowner suffers from a resource-protectingregulation.'
The groundwater litigations during the 1970s and beginning 1980s
further illustrate that substantive value judgments about natural resources
themselves are implicit in the rationales underlying the concrete application
of the concepts of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and "Situationsgebundenheit."
3. Case study: The groundwater litigations
The exploitation of gravel from groundwater has long been a
controversial topic in the framework of water law. Although water is not
intentionally being used, the Federal Water Code nevertheless requires a
permit because the process normally pollutes the groundwater as a
consequence of the disturbance. Maybe particularly because the
impairments in these cases are unintentional, many landowners seek
judicial review of administrative denials of permits to use groundwater in
these circumstances.
a) Early decisions of the Federal Supreme Court
Although the constitutionality of the Federal Water Code in general
had long been accepted, the Federal Supreme Court in 1973 explicitly used
the notion of "Situationsgebundenheit" in the specific case of a denial of a
permit to exploit gravel from the groundwater to reach the opposite result.'
The Court held that landowners could insist on compensation for permit
denials in these circumstances. According to the Federal Supreme Court,
these denials could not be justified along the lines of the
"Situationsgebundenheit" of the land; hence, this application violated
Art.14 1 1 Basic Law. The Court looked at previous uses and at the status
quo to establish the scope of the "Situationsgebundenheit." However,
contrary to previous analysis, the Court now asked whether possible future

80. Scrutinizing the quotations there also seems to be an implicit judgment that the
market cannot be relied on to serve the public interest with regard to water.
81. BGHZ 60, 126 (Nassauskiesungsurteil) (without explicitly referring to
Situationsgebundenheit already BGHZ 46, 17 (1966)).
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"reasonable economic exploitation" of the land was restricted or prohibited
by the water law regime.' As the exploitation of gravel was qualified as a
"naturally given" possibility of future use of the land, permit denials
without compensation were held to be unconstitutional.
This was a radical departure from established policy. The Federal
Supreme Court had previously even considered curtailments of already
exercised resource uses to be compatible with Art.14 11 Basic Law." Now
the Court held that unexercised "reasonable economic exploitations" could
not be restricted by the water law regime. This change in policy once again
demonstrates the flexibility and vagueness of a concept like "Situationsgebundenheit.""
b) Legislative amendment of the Federal Water Code (§la III WHG)
Clearly concerned with these shifts in the case law and as a
response to the ever-increasing scarcity of water, the federal parliament in
1976 enacted an important amendment to the Federal Water Code.'
Legislators added several provisions. For example, any administrative
decisions leading to a deterioration of the quality of water were prohibited
(§36b VI WHG) and the general use of water to the highest possible benefit
for the public was required (§ 36b I WHG). But most importantly in the
context of the groundwater litigations, § la III WHG explicitly clarified that
the ownership as such does not entitle a landowner to the use of surface
water or groundwater.
Despite this very clear legislative confirmation that Art.14 11 Basic
Law is not violated by any of the requirements of the permit system in the
Federal Water Code, the Federal Supreme Court, in 1978, again held that
the denial of a permit to exploit gravel from the groundwater on the basis
of the water law regime cannot be brought in line with Art.14 11 Basic Law.
The Court further held that the newly introduced § la III WHG itself is
unconstitutional, because the law illegitimately encroaches upon Art.14 11
Basic Law.8 6

82. BGHZ 60,126; see PAPIER, supra note 52,at n.395.
83. See BGHZ 48,193 (1967) (Kolner Hinterhausurteil).
84. Strongly criticizing these U-turns in the case law Hermann Soell, Die Bedeutung der
Sozialpflichtigkeit des Grundeigentums bei der Landschaftspflege und dem Naturschutz, 1983
DEuTscHls VERWALT NGsRLATT 241, 245.
85. For a discussion of the motives for the enactment see Bericht und Antrag des
Innenausschusses, Bundestags-Drucksache, 7/4546 (1976).
86. BGH NJW 1978, 2290.
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c) The "Nassauskiesung" decision of the Federal Constitutional Court
The Federal Constitutional Court is the final arbiter for evaluating
the constitutionality of statutes. Thus, the Federal Supreme Court had to
submit the case for review. In one of its most important and influential
decisions the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed its earlier rulings,
holding the water law regime to be constitutional even when the law denies
a landowner the necessary permit to exploit gravel from the groundwater.
Referring to its concept of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" to delineate public and
private interests in natural resources on the constitutional level, the Federal
Constitutional Court stated that property rights are not unconstitutionally
infringed, where "goods of vital importance to the community are subjected
to a discretionary permit system in order to secure the public weal...
Water is one of the most important prerequisites of all life... An ordered
distribution of it is vital for the community."8 Repeating the wording of
earlier decisions the Court held that "such a comprehensive task relating to
the public weal belongs to the typical tasks of the public law. It is not the
unilateral interest of the state that is being furthered, rather the public weal
is being protected by the water law regime." Once again the Federal
Constitutional Court used the abstract notion of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" in a
concrete application to introduce substantive value judgments about a
resource itself and about its significance to society. The Court held for
public interest despite grave encroachments upon the interests of the
individual owner.
4. Further amendments of the Federal Water Code: Ecosystem protection
In the early 1980s, the German public became more aware of the
significant interconnectedness and interwovenness of natural processes.
With regard to water, topics like the "Waldsterben" (the dying of forests
due to acid deposition) increased the public attention on these relationships.
The United States at the same time experienced a similar shift in consciousness.
Recognizing the necessity for a more comprehensive environmental

law regime that would better reflect the perceived interrelationships, the
German parliament in 1985 again amended the Federal Water Code.
Among other modifications, the parliament added a clause requiring the
water administrators to consider water to be part of an integral ecosystem."
Even though it is commonly held that this amendment did not change the

87. BVerfGE 58,300 (Nassauskiesungsurteil).
88.
89.

See also SIEDER ET AL., supra note 75, at n.25a.
See § la I WHG as amended by 4. AndG, Bundestags-Drucksache 10/3973.
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substantive content of the Federal Water Code, the "public weal" as
mentioned in § la I WHG is now interpreted to embrace purely ecological
values. For example, water managers may consider the sustenance of water
resources without any direct reference to human uses.'
5. Public values
The substantive value judgments underlying the constitutional
analysis of resource-distributing regimes are strongly dependent on public
opinion, the "Zeitgeist." Ideas like "Sozialpflichtigkeit"
and
"Situationsgebundenheit" are so abstract that they actually invite changing
social and political views to enter the considerations. Thus, the
constitutional delineation of public and private interests in natural
resources is a function of the values the public assigns to different goods at
different times.
The formal move towards a comprehensive public management of
water resources in Germany occurred with the enactment of the Federal
Water Code in 1957. However, despite this early start, litigation in the area
of groundwater demonstrates that the public failed to recognize and
support the early legislative decision until the end of the 1970s, when public
awareness of environmental problems and the limited availability of natural
resources emerged. Only then did the controversies about the regime in its
application to groundwater come to an end. Only then did the judgments
confirming the constitutionality of the discretionary water-distributing
regime based on "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and "Situationsgebundenheit"
achieve general acceptance and support. The interdependence of public
opinion and judgments about the constitutionality of environmental
regulations of private property rights can again be detected in the mid1980s. Social and political forces were a decisive factor in the development
of the 1985 amendment of the Federal Water Code introducing more
comprehensive ecosystem protection.'

See GIESEKE ET AL., supra note 75 at nn.3, 5.
91. Interestingly, environmental consciousness seems to evolve and expand roughly at
the same pace in Germany as in the United States. When controversies about the
constitutionality of the Federal Water Code came to an end in Germany, the U.S. legislature
90.

had just amended the Clean Water Act, introducing a water permit system in 1972. The
important "Nassauskiesung"-decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 58, 300,
(see supraat B.IV.3.c.) more or less coincides with the influential Mono Lake holding of the
California Supreme Court that was called the "high water mark" of recent public trust law
regarding water; National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d
709 (1983). Finally, the move towards more comprehensive ecosystem protection, marked
by the amendment of the Federal Water Code in Germany in 1985, occurred at about the
same time as in the United States, when the recognition of ecosystems as natural resources
developed. See Alison Rieser, Ecological preservation as a public property right: An emerging
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C. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN NATURAL RESOURCE
LAW-LATENT SIMILARITIES TO THE AMERICAN LAW
I. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
As the analysis of the motivations and value judgments underlying
the concepts of "Sozialpflichtigkeit" and "Situationsgebundenheit" in the
concrete application to natural resource conflicts has illustrated, the
decision, whether a particular dedication of a good to the public is in
consistence with Art.14 11 Basic Law, depends less and less on the gravity
of the encroachment and more and more on the question of the importance
to society of a specific natural resource. Recent developments in the German
law-interpreting discourse openly acknowledge the existence of these
underlying value judgments by explicitly considering whole categories of
natural goods themselves to be assigned to the public. When such a public
interest is recognized, the resource is, as a whole or in part, considered
inappropriate for private property. According to this currently developing
perspective, no private property exists at all from the outset, where a
natural resource is statutorily assigned to the public. The extent of private
property is, according to this view, negatively defined by an explicit positive
definition of public environmental interests. Based on the particularimportanceof
specific naturalgoods to the public these goods are taken out of the scope ofprivate
property. It is therefore impossible to vest rights in them to private
individuals.
Bosselmann, for example, holds that private property in land,
plants, or animals should only comprise the "fruits" that these resources
carry, and not the natural capital itself. 92 He therefore endorses a distinction
between the inalienable substance and the alienable use value, which
extends to the natural "fruits" of the goods. Czybulka wants to redefine
constitutional private property to comprise only those uses of natural goods
that are reconcilable with their social or ecological functions. 93 Isensee
summarizes the trend by stating that "the recent legal development tends
to exclude the bases of life a priori from the scope of private property...

doctrine in search of a theory, 15 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REv. 393, 432 (1991).

92. Klaus Bosselmann, Vom Umweltrecht zum Okorecht - Skizze eines grundlegenden
Wandels, 1994 JAHRBUCH DES UMWELT- UNv TEcHIKRCHTS 3,17.
93.

Detlef Czybulka, Eigentum an Natur, 1988 NATUR UND REc-T, 214, 216.
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This is not to be understood as a mere restriction of given and remaining
,
private property, but as a negative definition of its content."
II.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

This trend in German law of negatively defining the possible scope
of private property by explicitly postulating interests of the public in
natural goods is in fact not unknown in law. Already the Roman law
considered some resources inappropriate for private ownership because of
their importance to the public. 5 The idea was carried over into the English
and American law, where it evolved to become the public trust doctrine."
The public trust doctrine holds that certain natural resources are
inherently public. They are inalienable. Because of their importance for the
common weal it is impossible to vest private property rights in them. At the
same time, the government as trustee for the public has to assume the
94. Josef Isensee, DieAmbivalenz des Eigentumsgrundrechts,in EIGENTUMSGARANTIE UND
UMWELCHUTZ 3,14, 15. (FRITz OssENBOHL, ed. 1990).

95. The sea, running water, air, shores, beaches, swamps and the like were, according
to Roman understanding, common to all (res communes). These resources were either res
extra commercium and thereby by definition nobody's private property. This mainly applied
to running water, air, beaches and swamps. See Schmidt-Jortzig, supra note 2, at 1026. Or, as
seems to have been the case for banks of rivers in particular, private property rights were
formally permitted, but at the same time all
persons had the right to make use of the banks,
i.e. to bring vessels to them, to fasten the vessels by ropes and to place any part of their cargo
there. See Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes The
People's EnvironmentalRight, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.195,197 (1980). These rather vague and
undefined rights of use and enjoyment of the public are the origins of the public trust
doctrine, which found its earliest concise expression most clearly in the work of Justinian:
"By natural law, these things are common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and
with it the shores of the sea.' See JST-NIAN, THE INSrmums, book 2 title I point 1. Although
this declaration is by some authors considered to reflect rather Justinian's own idealization
of a legal regime than the true nature of public rights in the Roman empire, see Richard J.
Lazarus, ChangingConceptions Of PropertyAnd Sovereignty In NaturalResources:Questioning
The Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV.631, 634 (1986), his rules found their way into
subsequent eras and societies.
96. For a good overview, see Joseph L Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource
Law: Effective judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L REV. 471 (1970); Joseph L. Sax, LiberatingThe
PublicTrust DoctrineFrom Its HistoricShackles, 14 U.C. DAVISL. REV. 185 (1980); Stevens, supra
note 95; Gary D. Meyers, Variations On A Theme: Expanding The Public Trust Doctrine To
Include ProtectionOf Wildlife, 19 ENVrL. L.723 (1989); Harrison C. Dunning, The PublicTrust
Doctrine:A FundamentalDoctrine Of American PropertyLaw, 19 ENVTL. L. 515 (1989). More
critical: James L. Huffman, Trusting The PublicInterest To Judges:A Comment On The Public
Trust Writings Of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning And Johnson, 63 DENY. U. L. REV. 565
(1986); James L Huffman, Avoiding The Takings Clause Through The Myth Of Public Rights: The
Public TrustAnd The Reserved Rights DoctrinesAt Work, 3 LAND & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 171
(1987); Lazarus, supra note 95.
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responsibility of managing, maintaining and, to the extent appropriate,
distributing the trust resources.
The public trust doctrine in American law- like trespass as well as
public and private nuisance-is a common law concept. Common law
augments statutory regimes. Due to the large number of statutory
regulations today the public trust doctrine is only one of many ways to
delineate public and private interests in natural goods. However, in our
context the public trust doctrine is of specific interest because it argues on
the constitutional level. Public trust focuses on the question of public versus
private property, whereas many of the statutory approaches fail to explicitly
curtail private property interests. However, recent statutes have taken the
public trust doctrine into account, integrating it into their normative
structure97
III. LATENT SIMILARITIES
The public trust doctrine explicitly recognizes inalienable public
interests in natural goods with a corresponding impossibility of private
property in these goods. According to a current trend in German
environmental law private property rights in natural resources should be
defined by referring to the specific public interests in these resources; the
extent of private property is thus negatively defined by positively defining
environmental claims of the public. The similarity of the conceptual
structures seems striking. A further investigation of this correspondence
might well lead to a better understanding of the patterns of argumentation
underlying resource-distributing decisions.

97. Federal statutory enactments confirming public trust interests include the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1%9 (NEPA), which provides, inter alia, that it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations. National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 §101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1994); see PrTUS. MENLL &RICHARD B. STEWART,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND PoucY, 89Mff. (1994). Another very significant recent statutory
expression by Congress occurred in 1980 with the promulgation of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and with amendments
of the Clean Water Act; Congress thereby ordered federal and state authorities to sue to
recover damages to public trust resources caused by releases of oil or other hazardous
substances. According to the relevant provisions, CERCLA §§ 107(a)(4)(C), (f)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607(a)(4)(C), (f)(1) (1988); Clean Water Act §§ 311()(4),(5), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(f)(4),(5)
(1988), federal and state officials 'shall act on behalf of the public as trustee to recover
natural resource damages."
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D. CONCLUSION

The formal German "mechanism" of relating private property
rights in natural resources to public interests in the use or preservation of
these resources, the concept of the "Offentliche Sache," is unknown in the
United States. The abstract criteria for deciding upon the constitutionality
of "Offentliche Sache" regimes that are employed in the German legal
system ("Sozialpflichtigkeit" and "Situationsgebundenheit") do not have
a direct counterpart in American constitutional law. Even so, the analysis
of the motivations underlying decision-making iM this area of law in
Germany has revealed that in effect the two legal systems are not as far
apart as it might seem at a first glance. A current trend in German
environmental law explicitly acknowledges that the analysis of the
constitutionality of resource-protecting regulations is not based primarily
on the gravity of infringements in individual property rights but rather on
the question to what extent some natural resources are positively assigned
to the public. As in public trust law, private property is thus considered to
be negatively defined by positive assignments of goods to the public, which
do-a priori-not require compensation according to the takings clause. This
new understanding of the bearing of environmental law on private property
clearly shows that not only in the United States, where the public trust
doctrine is explicitly recognized, but also in Germany, value judgments
about and assignments of natural resources themselves are the bases for
deciding upon the proper delineation between private property interests in
these resources and the public weal.

